Technology transition in the national air transportation system : market failure and game theoretic analysis with application to ADS-B

This research analyzes the problem of technology transition in the national air transportation system, focusing on the implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is a key technology in the Federal Aviation Administration's plan to modernize the national civil air transportation surveillance system. Data regarding airline perception of benefits, barriers, and knowledge of ADS-B is presented. Market mechanisms that could potentially cause technology implementation failure are identified through game theoretic analysis of airline interview data. Potential market failures identified include public goods failures, cost-benefit asymmetries, information asymmetries, and risk dominance. Potential institutional failures identified include organizational process failures and bureaucratic interests and politics. Government action to correct market failures is explored. Government mechanisms to correct market failures include technology value, support infrastructure development, positive incentives, putative measures, and mandates.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2008

Author dc:creator

• Hu, Xiaojie

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Annalisa L. Weigel.

• Aeronautics and Astronautics.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45218

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/45218