Information and self-selection in the PIPE market

PIPEs (Private Investments in Public Equity) are unique in that they are negotiated privately between sophisticated investors and the public firm. As a result, the issue price deviates from the firm's stock price, often resulting in a substantial PIPE discount. However, only a limited set of firms issues equity at such a discount. PIPE issuers tend to be low quality, less transparent firms that cannot raise capital through traditional sources. As indicators of this quality, I examine the firm's accruals and audit quality in the year of its PIPE issuance. I find that the PIPE discount is more strongly associated with audit quality, and that firms with low quality auditors are issued at a 5% discount relative to comparable firms with high quality auditors. Much of this discount is due to self-selection, suggesting that higher quality PIPE issuers select high quality auditors.

Department dc:contributor.department

Sloan School of Management.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2007

Author dc:creator

• Koshal, Amit

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• S.P. Kothari.

• Sloan School of Management.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/42332

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/42332