Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe study seeks to explain the rise of "China threat" arguments in the United States and Japan in the 1990s by using three theories of states behavior- realism, organization theory, and democratic peace theory. The rise of "China threat" arguments occurred in the United States and Japan because of a convergence of several factors, the most important of which was the increase of China's relative power after the Cold War. The distribution of power among states strongly affects their intentions and military capabilities. The study introduces and suggests the importance of the strategic safety-net in shaping threat perception. A strategic safety-net emerges when state's survival depends on cooperation with another state. When the strategic safety-net exists, states suppress self-interested behavior and the ally's intentions are perceived as benign. Interviews with former government officials in the United States and Japan confirmed that strategic necessity restrained U.S. and Japanese behavior towards China during the Cold War and limited suspicion of China. The fraying of the strategic safety-net led to the advent of "China threat" arguments.
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2006
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Ueki, Chikako
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Barry R. Posen.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37435
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/37435