Regulatory competition and the politics of environmental enforcement

Does interstate economic competition result in states weakening their environmental regulation? Scholars have long been interested in this question. Of particular concern, is whether this type of behavior leads to a "race to the bottom" in U.S. state environmental regulatory behavior. Although there is a mature theoretical literature investigating the conditions under which regulators will use environmental measures as competitive instruments vis-a.-vis other states for attracting economic investment, the empirical literature has lagged far behind in testing the direct predictions of the race to the bottom argument. The purpose of this project is test the applicability of the race to the bottom argument in U.S. state environmental regulation. To test the race to the bottom argument, I examine both behavioral' and attitudinal evidence. Specifically, I estimate a series of strategic interaction models which aim to detect whether state enforcement of three federal pollution control programs - the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - follows a pattern consistent with regulatory competition theory generally, and the race to the bottom argument specifically. I also conduct a nationwide survey of senior officials working in state environmental agencies.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2006

Author dc:creator

• Konisky, David M

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Stephen M. Meyer.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/35542

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/35542