Truth in explanation

My thesis consists of three papers on truth and explanations in science. Broadly, the question I ask is semantic. Should the best account of certain bits of our scientific practice focus on the concept of truth? More specifically, should the crucial distinctions between good and bad aspects of that practice be drawn in terms of truth? My thesis consists of three case studies: ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences, appeals to idealizations in the application of theories, and the analysis of explanations quite generally, exemplified in the asymmetry of explanation. In each case, prominent philosophers have argued that a proper treatment does not focus on truth. In each case, I argue that truth should play a central role. And in each case, the issue turns, at least in part, on the connection between the scientific practice in question and explanations.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2005

Author dc:creator

• Nickel, Bernhard, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Edward J. Hall, Robert C. Stalnaker and Stephen Yablo.

• Linguistics and Philosophy.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33711

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/33711