Secrecy, deception and intelligence failure : explaining operational surprise in war

Operational surprise attacks are large-scale, theater-level intrawar attacks, which result from a country misestimating the capabilities and intentions of its enemies. This thesis analyzes how these massive surprise attacks occur during war when countries should be especially wary of their enemies and vigilant for any evidence of attack. Three hypotheses may explain the frequency and success of operational surprise attacks including operational secrecy, strategic deception, and intelligence failure. Using the Battle of the Bulge in World War II and the Chinese counteroffensive in the Korean War as case studies, this analysis illustrates these three elements and evaluates their relative causal weight in these attacks. This study concludes that each hypothesis is a contributing element to the surprise attack, but that a failure of intelligence is the critical factor. Moreover, this failure stems from a "victory disease" - a belief held by military leaders and their intelligence staff when victory appears near that one's enemy is too weak or has allowed the opportunity to mount a successful counterattack pass.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2005

Author dc:creator

• Waters, Lonn Augustine

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Barry Posen.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33710

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/33710