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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

On symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The universally composable symbolic analysis (UCSA) framework layers Dolev-Yao style symbolic analysis on top of the universally composable (UC) secure framework to construct computationally sound proofs of cryptographic protocol security. The original proposal of the UCSA framework by Canetti and Herzog (2004) focused on protocols that only use public key encryption to achieve 2-party mutual authentication or key exchange. This thesis expands the framework to include protocols that use digital signatures as well. In the process of expanding the framework, we identify a flaw in the framework's use of UC ideal functionality FKE. We also identify issues that arise when combining FKE with the current formulation of ideal signature functionality FSI,. Motivated by these discoveries, we redefine the FPKE and FsIG functionalities appropriately.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2005

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Patil, Akshay (Akshay R.)
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ronald L. Rivest and Ran Canetti.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33331
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/33331

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Patil, Akshay (Akshay R.). On symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33331