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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Multi-round auctions for institutional real estate assets : theory and practice

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The theory of auctions has grown dramatically over the last four decades; it offers guidance and insights into the conduct of efficient and optimal auctions in real estate, and other industries. In this thesis an auction process used to sell institutional real estate assets in the US is identified. This auction came into being during the 1990s, and is now in common use. The auction is recorded though surveys with industry representatives and is characterized. Problems with the auction are identified, and solutions are proposed, referencing this auction to the body of auction theory. The auction consists of two rounds of sealed bid submissions, with attrition in the number of competitive bidders. After competitive bidding is complete a preferred bidder is selected, and engages in due diligence, a practice that often uncovers new information and induces renegotiation. Bids are not binding during the bidding process, because the auction is informationally incomplete. Sellers analyze bids based on the perceived quality of the bidder as a contractual partner, as well as the bid's value, complicating the objective selection of the best bidder. The auction is bilaterally incomplete and unstable, potentially influencing efficiency and optimality. Recommendations to improve the process are made. Descriptive statistics are formed and presented of multi-round auctions for institutional real estate assets.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2003

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Foley, J. Aidan (James Aidan), 1977-
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • William C. Wheaton.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29775
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/29775

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Foley, J. Aidan (James Aidan), 1977-. Multi-round auctions for institutional real estate assets : theory and practice. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29775