{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/29403"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/29403","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Control, incentives and penalties in the transit contracting process","abstract":"The last decade of the twentieth century was characterized by financial and budget constraints in almost all government activities. Transportation was no exception, and many countries moved to private operation as a way to reduce their need for operating and capital subsidies, and acquire technical competency to produce higher quality public services. Private participation, however, may require the implementation of a regulatory instrument to ensure the accomplishment of public goals. The most common form of regulation for large transit systems is the use of concession contracts. They govern the relationship between the government and the private provider, converting government's objectives into the economic variables that guide the private firm behavior. This thesis analyzes a variety of issues that should be considered by a government agency studying private involvement in transit operations by bringing together concepts from different fields such as economics, law, political science, negotiation, policy making, engineering, and transportation science. First the entire menu of alternatives for private participation and regulation is presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of contracts as legal instruments are analyzed. Next, a qualitative approach uses a six stages project evolution framework to identify the most relevant variables that can considerably affect the outcome of the concession process and analyzes them in detail. Third, a quantitative approach uses a business model to study the relevance of the incentives and penalties arrangement in the contract and its influence in the service outcome.","abstract_html":"The last decade of the twentieth century was characterized by financial and budget constraints in almost all government activities. Transportation was no exception, and many countries moved to private operation as a way to reduce their need for operating and capital subsidies, and acquire technical competency to produce higher quality public services. Private participation, however, may require the implementation of a regulatory instrument to ensure the accomplishment of public goals. The most common form of regulation for large transit systems is the use of concession contracts. They govern the relationship between the government and the private provider, converting government's objectives into the economic variables that guide the private firm behavior. This thesis analyzes a variety of issues that should be considered by a government agency studying private involvement in transit operations by bringing together concepts from different fields such as economics, law, political science, negotiation, policy making, engineering, and transportation science. First the entire menu of alternatives for private participation and regulation is presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of contracts as legal instruments are analyzed. Next, a qualitative approach uses a six stages project evolution framework to identify the most relevant variables that can considerably affect the outcome of the concession process and analyzes them in detail. Third, a quantitative approach uses a business model to study the relevance of the incentives and penalties arrangement in the contract and its influence in the service outcome.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Raspall Galli, Demian, 1973-"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering.","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Frederick P. Salvucci."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2004,"date_issued":"2004","date_published":"2004","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:10Z","subjects":["Civil and Environmental Engineering."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."],"rights_urls":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29403","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Frederick P. Salvucci."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.other","label":"Dc Contributor Other","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29403"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2004.","Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-154)."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The last decade of the twentieth century was characterized by financial and budget constraints in almost all government activities. Transportation was no exception, and many countries moved to private operation as a way to reduce their need for operating and capital subsidies, and acquire technical competency to produce higher quality public services. Private participation, however, may require the implementation of a regulatory instrument to ensure the accomplishment of public goals. The most common form of regulation for large transit systems is the use of concession contracts. They govern the relationship between the government and the private provider, converting government's objectives into the economic variables that guide the private firm behavior. This thesis analyzes a variety of issues that should be considered by a government agency studying private involvement in transit operations by bringing together concepts from different fields such as economics, law, political science, negotiation, policy making, engineering, and transportation science. First the entire menu of alternatives for private participation and regulation is presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of contracts as legal instruments are analyzed. Next, a qualitative approach uses a six stages project evolution framework to identify the most relevant variables that can considerably affect the outcome of the concession process and analyzes them in detail. Third, a quantitative approach uses a business model to study the relevance of the incentives and penalties arrangement in the contract and its influence in the service outcome.","(cont.) And finally, three case studies provide the evidence and lessons from real experience to fund and explore the findings of the entire analysis. The theoretical analysis and the case studies show that competency and honesty in both the government oversight and the concession are a requirement to run the concession process efficiently and effectively. Transparency and publicity, labor negotiations, asset deterioration during the process, adequate timing and flexibility in operations and control have been identified as extremely relevant variables affecting concession results. Contract incentives and penalties can affect contract outcome, but the agency-contractor relationship and the parties' optimization horizon are the most important consideration in successful concessions. Only competent and honest management are capable of achieving win-win opportunities."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M."]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Control, incentives and penalties in the transit contracting process"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Frederick P. Salvucci."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering."],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering."],"dc:creator":["Raspall Galli, Demian, 1973-"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2005-10-14T20:21:31Z"],"dc:date.available":["2005-10-14T20:21:31Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2004"],"dc:description":["Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2004.","Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-154)."],"dc:description.abstract":["The last decade of the twentieth century was characterized by financial and budget constraints in almost all government activities. Transportation was no exception, and many countries moved to private operation as a way to reduce their need for operating and capital subsidies, and acquire technical competency to produce higher quality public services. Private participation, however, may require the implementation of a regulatory instrument to ensure the accomplishment of public goals. The most common form of regulation for large transit systems is the use of concession contracts. They govern the relationship between the government and the private provider, converting government's objectives into the economic variables that guide the private firm behavior. This thesis analyzes a variety of issues that should be considered by a government agency studying private involvement in transit operations by bringing together concepts from different fields such as economics, law, political science, negotiation, policy making, engineering, and transportation science. First the entire menu of alternatives for private participation and regulation is presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of contracts as legal instruments are analyzed. Next, a qualitative approach uses a six stages project evolution framework to identify the most relevant variables that can considerably affect the outcome of the concession process and analyzes them in detail. Third, a quantitative approach uses a business model to study the relevance of the incentives and penalties arrangement in the contract and its influence in the service outcome.","(cont.) And finally, three case studies provide the evidence and lessons from real experience to fund and explore the findings of the entire analysis. The theoretical analysis and the case studies show that competency and honesty in both the government oversight and the concession are a requirement to run the concession process efficiently and effectively. Transparency and publicity, labor negotiations, asset deterioration during the process, adequate timing and flexibility in operations and control have been identified as extremely relevant variables affecting concession results. Contract incentives and penalties can affect contract outcome, but the agency-contractor relationship and the parties' optimization horizon are the most important consideration in successful concessions. Only competent and honest management are capable of achieving win-win opportunities."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M."],"dc:format.mimetype":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29403"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Civil and Environmental Engineering."],"dc:title":["Control, incentives and penalties in the transit contracting process"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:10Z"}