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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Leashes or lemmings? : alliances as restraining devices

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Does alliance restraint happen in international affairs? What theories explain the success or failure of restraint efforts? Do states ever form alliances in order to restrain? Alliance restraint - an actual or anticipated diplomatic effort by one ally to influence a second ally not to proceed with a proposed military policy or not to continue an existing military policy - most definitely happens in international affairs, and sometimes it is successful. This study of alliance restraint suggests three central conclusions about alliances: 1) On both a conceptual and empirical level, the alliance restraint dynamic means that alliances can have a stabilizing and peace-promoting effect on the international system. When calculating the net impact of alliances on international peace and stability, scholars should account for restraint, not just chainganging, buckpassing, and other pathological (destabilizing) alliance dynamics described by Waltz, Posen, Snyder & Christensen, and Vasquez. 2) The success or failure of restraint efforts is best explained by rational restraint theory - a combination of capabilities, interests, and communication. Rational restraint theory, analogous to rational deterrence theory, provides a better explanation than ones based on power, alliance norms, or domestic opinion. This is demonstrated in three cases of Anglo-American decisionmaking in the Middle East and Asia in the 1950s: Iran (1951), Indochina (1954), and Egypt (1956 Suez Crisis).

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2002

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Pressman, Jeremy, 1969-
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Stephen W. Van Evera.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29267
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/29267

Chain of custody

source
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MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
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citation

Pressman, Jeremy, 1969-. Leashes or lemmings? : alliances as restraining devices. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29267