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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Computational soundness for standard assumptions of formal cryptography

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This implementation is conceptually simple, and relies only on general assumptions. Specifically, it can be thought of as a 'self-referential' variation on a well-known encryption scheme. 4. Lastly, we show how the computational soundness of the Dolev-Yao model can be maintained even as it is extended to include new operators. In particular, we show how the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme and the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption can be added to the Dolev-Yao model in a computationally sound way.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2004

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Herzog, Jonathan, 1975-
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ron Rivest.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28713
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/28713

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Herzog, Jonathan, 1975-. Computational soundness for standard assumptions of formal cryptography. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28713