Essays on the relation between managers' incentives and financial accounting information

(cont.) around thresholds do convey information about a firm's future performance, firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry between the management and investors are more likely to use this signaling mechanism, and the capital market recognizes the information content of the earnings management activities and rationally incorporates it in setting prices.

Department dc:contributor.department

Sloan School of Management.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2004

Author dc:creator

• Xue, Yanfeng, 1974-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• S.P. Kothari.

• Sloan School of Management.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

en_US

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28685

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/28685