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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis explores how truckload carriers use conditional bids within the framework of a combinatorial auction to win more business and balance their existing networks. Because a considerable portion of a truckload carrier's cost of serving a given lane is associated with the probability of finding a follow-on load (i.e. economies of scope), bidding on a lane-by-lane basis may not accurately reflect a carrier's true cost of serving that lane. In a combinatorial auction, a truckload carrier can more accurately reflect its true cost of serving a given lane by offering package discounts, conditional on winning lanes that increase the probability of finding follow-on loads. Though a considerable amount has been written about the economics of truckload carrier's operations and the benefits of combinatorial auctions to shippers, few have studied conditional bidding from a bidder's (carrier's) perspective. This thesis makes three contributions. First, an explanation of why bidders do and don't submit conditional bids in combinatorial auctions is provided. Second, a model of carrier costs functions, including package discounts (a measure of economies of scope) is developed. Finally, this thesis examines regional pricing differences, and quantifies the amount by which carriers will change their prices in different regions of the US.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2003

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Yosef Sheffi.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28578
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/28578

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-. Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28578