Essays on the political economy of labor market regulation

The stringency of employment protection regulations varies substantially across countries. This thesis studies three mechanisms that can help explain the extent and persistence of this variation. The first chapter explores the ability of employment protection to generate its own political support. Using a version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model, I show that the presence or absence of this ability depends crucially on the features of wage determination. Under the standard assumption of continuous time Nash bargaining, workers value employment protection because it strengthens their hand in bargaining. Workers in high productivity matches benefit most. Yet employment protection shifts the distribution of match-specific productivity toward lower values and thus away from the supporters of regulation. Bilaterally inefficient separations are a feature of wage setting that can partially reverse this negative result. Now workers value employment protection because it delays involuntary dismissals. Workers in low productivity matches gain most since they face the highest risk of layoff. The shift of the productivity distribution toward lower values then becomes a shift toward supporters of employment protection. The second chapter puts forward a simple Ricardian argument suggesting that trade integration can sustain diversity in employment protection regulations. Trade integration enables a rigid country to specialize in activities less dependent on flexibility, mitigating the cost of rigidity. Conversely, it makes a flexible country less willing to become rigid, since doing so means forgoing the gains from trade induced by diverse regulation.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2004

Author dc:creator

• Bruegemann, Bjoren Axel, 1974-

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Ricardo Caballero and Ivan Werning.

• Economics.

Statement dc:rights

• M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

en_US

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28364

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/28364