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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Analyst Incentives

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Analyst forecasts have been shown to reflect substantial behavioral biases and predict a number of macroeconomic phenomena. While we typically treat reported forecasts as statistical expectations, under uncertainty the reported point estimate will be sensitive to the payoff structure facing the forecaster. Using data on careers from LinkedIn, I describe the incentive structures faced by analysts, shedding light the extent to which pay and career success are tied to performance. Further, I extend a causal estimator to identify credible counterfactual forecasts and provide tentative causal evidence of the relationship between forecast errors and promotions.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master
Department dc:contributor.department
Sloan School of Management
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Green, Brice
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Thesmar, David

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
  • Copyright retained by author(s)

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/164556
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/164556

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Green, Brice. Analyst Incentives. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2025. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/164556