Back to results

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Strategizing against online learners in normal form repeated games

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

With the advent of machine learning and AI, learning algorithms are becoming more and more prevalent in online learning settings, where sequential decision-making is required. In such settings, the decisions of each agent can affect the utilities (or losses) of the other agents, as well as influence the decisions made by other agents later on in the interaction. Therefore, if an agent is good at anticipating the behavior of the other agents, in particular how they will make decisions in each round as a function of their experience thus far, he could try to judiciously make his own decisions over the rounds of the interaction so as to influence the other agents to behave in a way that ultimately benefits his own utility. In this thesis, we study repeated two-player games involving two agents: a learner, which employs an online learning algorithm to choose his strategy in each round; and an optimizer, which knows the learner’s utility function, parameters and the learner’s online learning algorithm. The optimizer wants to plan ahead to maximize his own utility while taking into account the learner’s behavior. We study this setting in zero-sum and general-sum games. In zero-sum games, we provide algorithms for the optimizer that can efficiently exploit a learner that employs a specific online learning algorithm in discrete and continuous-time dynamics. Specifically, the learner employs the Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) algorithm for the discrete-time games, and the Replicator Dynamics in the continuous-time games. In general-sum games, we provide a negative result. Our negative result shows that, unless P=NP, there is no Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for maximizing the utility of an optimizer against a learner that best responds to the history in each round. We additionally provide exponential-time algorithms that efficiently strategize against a learner that uses MWU, as well as a new way of thinking about strategizing against online learners via calculus of variations.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Assos, Angelos
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Daskalakis, Constantinos

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
  • Copyright retained by author(s)

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/159121
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/159121

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Assos, Angelos. Strategizing against online learners in normal form repeated games. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2025. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/159121