{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/157880"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/157880","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Not Function but Function Conquered: Against a Functionalist Theory of Directives","abstract":"Ordering, requesting, and inviting are examples of directive speech acts. Philosophers have offered different accounts of what it is to perform a directive, which they have developed using different theoretical resources. Attitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain what it is to perform a directive in terms of a speaker’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. Nonattitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain directives in terms of something else. This thesis is concerned with functionalism, a nonattitudinal theory of speech acts. According to functionalism, performing a directive is making an utterance with the etiological function of causing hearers to act in response to one’s utterance. I argue that functionalism is false. I develop counterexamples that show functionalism is too permissive about the kinds of causation suitable for generating directives. I argue further that the most plausible way to address these counterexamples is to become more attitudinal: rather than be permissive, functionalism should hold that directives and hearers’ responses to them are caused by specific internal processes.","abstract_html":"Ordering, requesting, and inviting are examples of directive speech acts. Philosophers have offered different accounts of what it is to perform a directive, which they have developed using different theoretical resources. Attitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain what it is to perform a directive in terms of a speaker’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. Nonattitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain directives in terms of something else. This thesis is concerned with functionalism, a nonattitudinal theory of speech acts. According to functionalism, performing a directive is making an utterance with the etiological function of causing hearers to act in response to one’s utterance. I argue that functionalism is false. I develop counterexamples that show functionalism is too permissive about the kinds of causation suitable for generating directives. I argue further that the most plausible way to address these counterexamples is to become more attitudinal: rather than be permissive, functionalism should hold that directives and hearers’ responses to them are caused by specific internal processes.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hill, John"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Khoo, Justin"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-09","date_published":"2024-09","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:19Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"],"rights_urls":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/157880","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Khoo, Justin"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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Philosophers have offered different accounts of what it is to perform a directive, which they have developed using different theoretical resources. Attitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain what it is to perform a directive in terms of a speaker’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. Nonattitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain directives in terms of something else. This thesis is concerned with functionalism, a nonattitudinal theory of speech acts. According to functionalism, performing a directive is making an utterance with the etiological function of causing hearers to act in response to one’s utterance. I argue that functionalism is false. I develop counterexamples that show functionalism is too permissive about the kinds of causation suitable for generating directives. I argue further that the most plausible way to address these counterexamples is to become more attitudinal: rather than be permissive, functionalism should hold that directives and hearers’ responses to them are caused by specific internal processes."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Not Function but Function Conquered: Against a Functionalist Theory of Directives"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Khoo, Justin"],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Hill, John"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2024-12-18T18:18:16Z"],"dc:date.available":["2024-12-18T18:18:16Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2024-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["Ordering, requesting, and inviting are examples of directive speech acts. Philosophers have offered different accounts of what it is to perform a directive, which they have developed using different theoretical resources. Attitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain what it is to perform a directive in terms of a speaker’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. Nonattitudinal theories of speech acts try to explain directives in terms of something else. This thesis is concerned with functionalism, a nonattitudinal theory of speech acts. According to functionalism, performing a directive is making an utterance with the etiological function of causing hearers to act in response to one’s utterance. I argue that functionalism is false. I develop counterexamples that show functionalism is too permissive about the kinds of causation suitable for generating directives. I argue further that the most plausible way to address these counterexamples is to become more attitudinal: rather than be permissive, functionalism should hold that directives and hearers’ responses to them are caused by specific internal processes."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/157880"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"],"dc:rights.uri":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dc:title":["Not Function but Function Conquered: Against a Functionalist Theory of Directives"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master","Master of Science in Philosophy"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:19Z"}