{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/155991"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/155991","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Box Jumping: Portfolio Recompositions to Achieve Higher Morningstar Ratings","abstract":"I show that actively-managed mutual funds often pursue higher Morningstar ratings at the expense of lower investment returns. Funds achieve higher ratings by changing their holdings to induce Morningstar to reclassify them into size/value style boxes with worse average performance. This practice, which I label `box jumping', sacrifices fund performance but nonetheless attracts large inflows of capital because funds are rated based on their relative performance within style boxes. Box jumping funds also take advantage by charging higher fees, which investors pay despite the ratings upgrade reversing on average within three years. These patterns emerge after 2002 when Morningstar ratings became based on relative performance within style boxes, and are predictably absent beforehand. I also show that pervasive box jumping creates negative spillover effects to other funds. Together, my findings highlight portfolio recomposition as a novel lever that funds employ to manipulate Morningstar ratings, and that funds box jump despite sacrificing returns because investors fixate on ratings when allocating capital.","abstract_html":"I show that actively-managed mutual funds often pursue higher Morningstar ratings at the expense of lower investment returns. Funds achieve higher ratings by changing their holdings to induce Morningstar to reclassify them into size/value style boxes with worse average performance. This practice, which I label `box jumping', sacrifices fund performance but nonetheless attracts large inflows of capital because funds are rated based on their relative performance within style boxes. Box jumping funds also take advantage by charging higher fees, which investors pay despite the ratings upgrade reversing on average within three years. These patterns emerge after 2002 when Morningstar ratings became based on relative performance within style boxes, and are predictably absent beforehand. I also show that pervasive box jumping creates negative spillover effects to other funds. Together, my findings highlight portfolio recomposition as a novel lever that funds employ to manipulate Morningstar ratings, and that funds box jump despite sacrificing returns because investors fixate on ratings when allocating capital.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kim, David Sunghyo"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["So, Eric C."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-05","date_published":"2024-05","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:55Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"],"rights_urls":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155991","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["So, Eric C."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Sloan School of Management"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kim, David Sunghyo"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2024-08-12T14:13:43Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-08-12T14:13:43Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2024-05"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master","Master of Science in Management Research"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155991"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I show that actively-managed mutual funds often pursue higher Morningstar ratings at the expense of lower investment returns. Funds achieve higher ratings by changing their holdings to induce Morningstar to reclassify them into size/value style boxes with worse average performance. This practice, which I label `box jumping', sacrifices fund performance but nonetheless attracts large inflows of capital because funds are rated based on their relative performance within style boxes. Box jumping funds also take advantage by charging higher fees, which investors pay despite the ratings upgrade reversing on average within three years. These patterns emerge after 2002 when Morningstar ratings became based on relative performance within style boxes, and are predictably absent beforehand. I also show that pervasive box jumping creates negative spillover effects to other funds. Together, my findings highlight portfolio recomposition as a novel lever that funds employ to manipulate Morningstar ratings, and that funds box jump despite sacrificing returns because investors fixate on ratings when allocating capital."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Box Jumping: Portfolio Recompositions to Achieve Higher Morningstar Ratings"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["So, Eric C."],"dc:contributor.department":["Sloan School of Management"],"dc:creator":["Kim, David Sunghyo"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2024-08-12T14:13:43Z"],"dc:date.available":["2024-08-12T14:13:43Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2024-05"],"dc:description.abstract":["I show that actively-managed mutual funds often pursue higher Morningstar ratings at the expense of lower investment returns. Funds achieve higher ratings by changing their holdings to induce Morningstar to reclassify them into size/value style boxes with worse average performance. This practice, which I label `box jumping', sacrifices fund performance but nonetheless attracts large inflows of capital because funds are rated based on their relative performance within style boxes. Box jumping funds also take advantage by charging higher fees, which investors pay despite the ratings upgrade reversing on average within three years. These patterns emerge after 2002 when Morningstar ratings became based on relative performance within style boxes, and are predictably absent beforehand. I also show that pervasive box jumping creates negative spillover effects to other funds. Together, my findings highlight portfolio recomposition as a novel lever that funds employ to manipulate Morningstar ratings, and that funds box jump despite sacrificing returns because investors fixate on ratings when allocating capital."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155991"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"],"dc:rights.uri":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dc:title":["Box Jumping: Portfolio Recompositions to Achieve Higher Morningstar Ratings"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master","Master of Science in Management Research"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:55Z"}