{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/155852"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/155852","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Attention To Retention: The Informativeness Of Insider's Decision to Retain Shares","abstract":"I show that corporate insiders’ decision to retain shares is pervasive and informative about future firm performance. Insiders file Form 144 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission to report their intention to introduce unregistered stock into their company’s public float. However, the form is not binding—insiders can legally choose to not follow through with a proposed sale at virtually no cost. I document that insiders’ retaining shares is pervasive: for as much as 36% of the proposed sales, insiders choose to retain at least some of the shares (i.e., “Retentions”) after they could have sold them. Retentions are associated with a 4.0% increase in annualized returns versus Sales. Additional analyses suggest that retaining shares is related to private information about the firm’s financial performance and to stock mispricing. Collectively, the results highlight yet another signal that should be accounted for when interpreting insiders’ trading decisions.","abstract_html":"I show that corporate insiders’ decision to retain shares is pervasive and informative about future firm performance. Insiders file Form 144 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission to report their intention to introduce unregistered stock into their company’s public float. However, the form is not binding—insiders can legally choose to not follow through with a proposed sale at virtually no cost. I document that insiders’ retaining shares is pervasive: for as much as 36% of the proposed sales, insiders choose to retain at least some of the shares (i.e., “Retentions”) after they could have sold them. Retentions are associated with a 4.0% increase in annualized returns versus Sales. Additional analyses suggest that retaining shares is related to private information about the firm’s financial performance and to stock mispricing. Collectively, the results highlight yet another signal that should be accounted for when interpreting insiders’ trading decisions.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Voelcker, Gabriel"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Doctoral","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["So, Eric","Verdi, Rodrigo"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-05","date_published":"2024-05","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:21Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"],"rights_urls":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155852","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["So, Eric","Verdi, Rodrigo"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Sloan School of Management"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Voelcker, Gabriel"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2024-08-01T19:01:19Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-08-01T19:01:19Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2024-05"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctoral","Doctor of Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155852"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I show that corporate insiders’ decision to retain shares is pervasive and informative about future firm performance. Insiders file Form 144 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission to report their intention to introduce unregistered stock into their company’s public float. However, the form is not binding—insiders can legally choose to not follow through with a proposed sale at virtually no cost. I document that insiders’ retaining shares is pervasive: for as much as 36% of the proposed sales, insiders choose to retain at least some of the shares (i.e., “Retentions”) after they could have sold them. Retentions are associated with a 4.0% increase in annualized returns versus Sales. Additional analyses suggest that retaining shares is related to private information about the firm’s financial performance and to stock mispricing. Collectively, the results highlight yet another signal that should be accounted for when interpreting insiders’ trading decisions."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Attention To Retention: The Informativeness Of Insider's Decision to Retain Shares"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["So, Eric","Verdi, Rodrigo"],"dc:contributor.department":["Sloan School of Management"],"dc:creator":["Voelcker, Gabriel"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2024-08-01T19:01:19Z"],"dc:date.available":["2024-08-01T19:01:19Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2024-05"],"dc:description.abstract":["I show that corporate insiders’ decision to retain shares is pervasive and informative about future firm performance. Insiders file Form 144 with the US Securities and Exchange Commission to report their intention to introduce unregistered stock into their company’s public float. However, the form is not binding—insiders can legally choose to not follow through with a proposed sale at virtually no cost. I document that insiders’ retaining shares is pervasive: for as much as 36% of the proposed sales, insiders choose to retain at least some of the shares (i.e., “Retentions”) after they could have sold them. Retentions are associated with a 4.0% increase in annualized returns versus Sales. Additional analyses suggest that retaining shares is related to private information about the firm’s financial performance and to stock mispricing. Collectively, the results highlight yet another signal that should be accounted for when interpreting insiders’ trading decisions."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/155852"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright retained by author(s)"],"dc:rights.uri":["https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dc:title":["Attention To Retention: The Informativeness Of Insider's Decision to Retain Shares"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctoral","Doctor of Philosophy"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:21Z"}