Back to results

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Discovering Novel Microarchitectural Security Vulnerabilities in Modern Processors

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

For decades, computer security issues such as viruses, worms, and Trojans have caused significant damages to computer systems across the world. Many of these security issues are caused by vulnerabilities in software allowing for memory corruption, a kind of attack where the contents of a computer’s memory are corrupted by an attacker to change a program’s behavior. While much research has been done on how to improve software security, vendors are increasingly turning to hardware defenses to compensate for software vulnerabilities. One such example is ARM Pointer Authentication, a security feature that enforces pointer integrity through the use of cryptographic hashes. I will introduce the PACMAN attack, a novel attack methodology that defeats Pointer Authentication by leveraging the behavior of the CPU’s microarchitecture. I will present multiple proof-of-concept attacks showing PACMAN defeating Pointer Authentication on the Apple M1 SoC, the world’s first desktop processor that supports Pointer Authentication. I will also document the tools I have created to perform detailed reverse engineering of the microarchitecture on Apple Silicon platforms, enabling both this work and future research. I will also present two memory corruption vulnerabilities I have discovered and reported in modern operating systems as case studies of the kind of software vulnerability Pointer Authentication tries to mitigate. The first is an uninitialized memory issue in Linux, and the second is a race condition leading to a type confusion in XNU. Finally, I will present a series of classroom exercises I have created to teach students about CPU vulnerabilities like PACMAN.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ravichandran, Joseph
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Yan, Mengjia

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
  • Copyright retained by author(s)

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152860
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/152860

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Ravichandran, Joseph. Discovering Novel Microarchitectural Security Vulnerabilities in Modern Processors. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152860