{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/144947"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/144947","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Long Term Policy Goals Under Electoral Competition Given Varied Temporal Discount Rates Among Voters","abstract":"Many important issues facing the world involve temporal tradeoffs, requiring costly investment in the short term for payoffs that accrue much later. However, politicians facing frequent elections are held accountable to voter preferences, where voters tend to be myopic, making investment difficult. Further, the costs and benefits of an investment are often distributed unevenly across voters. Thus investments take a two dimensional shape, creating both cross-sectional and inter-temporal distributions of utility. This paper examines under what conditions investment can occur, and studies how different levels and types of investments distribute utility. We develop a model involving multiple voting districts with variable time preferences and model a game involving legislative action followed by an election, solving the game via backward induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.","abstract_html":"Many important issues facing the world involve temporal tradeoffs, requiring costly investment in the short term for payoffs that accrue much later. However, politicians facing frequent elections are held accountable to voter preferences, where voters tend to be myopic, making investment difficult. Further, the costs and benefits of an investment are often distributed unevenly across voters. Thus investments take a two dimensional shape, creating both cross-sectional and inter-temporal distributions of utility. This paper examines under what conditions investment can occur, and studies how different levels and types of investments distribute utility. We develop a model involving multiple voting districts with variable time preferences and model a game involving legislative action followed by an election, solving the game via backward induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Nicholas, Sara"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Magazinnik, Asya"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-05","date_published":"2022-05","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:42Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright MIT"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144947","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Magazinnik, Asya"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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However, politicians facing frequent elections are held accountable to voter preferences, where voters tend to be myopic, making investment difficult. Further, the costs and benefits of an investment are often distributed unevenly across voters. Thus investments take a two dimensional shape, creating both cross-sectional and inter-temporal distributions of utility. This paper examines under what conditions investment can occur, and studies how different levels and types of investments distribute utility. We develop a model involving multiple voting districts with variable time preferences and model a game involving legislative action followed by an election, solving the game via backward induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["M.Eng."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Long Term Policy Goals Under Electoral Competition Given Varied Temporal Discount Rates Among Voters"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Magazinnik, Asya"],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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We develop a model involving multiple voting districts with variable time preferences and model a game involving legislative action followed by an election, solving the game via backward induction to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria."],"dc:description.degree":["M.Eng."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144947"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright MIT"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dc:title":["Long Term Policy Goals Under Electoral Competition Given Varied Temporal Discount Rates Among Voters"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master","Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:42Z"}