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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Optimizing Memory-Corruption Security Defenses for Real-Time Systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Real-Time Systems (RTSs) frequently suffer from memory-corruption attacks. Compared to general-purpose systems, RTSs differ because of their scheduling requirements. For this reason, many modern-day security defenses are not compatible with RTSs or impose too much performance overhead to be schedulable. This thesis presents a new Mixed Integer Linear Programming optimization algorithm — Defense Optimization Algorithm for Real-time system Memory-Corruption Security (DOARMS) — that determines the optimal, yet schedulable, set of defenses to protect RTSs against memory-corruption attacks. Experiments using DOARMS showed that 71% or less utilization is needed for ideal security coverage with the defenses considered and that the algorithm produced better results than selecting the defenses with the best security coverage. A case-study using a smaller subset of defenses also showed that using worst-case instead of average-case performance overheads for defenses leads to lower security coverage, and that more work is needed to quantify the worst-case performance overheads. DOARMS also supports optional weights representing the importance of security for each task and prioritizes the security of the tasks according to those weights. The runtime performance of the algorithm is reasonable with a single optimization taking an average of ∼ 14s and a maximum of ∼ 114s to run, making it a useful tool to help RTS designers secure their RTSs from memory-corruption attacks.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2022

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Horne, Amanda
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ward, Bryan
  • Burow, Nathan
  • Shrobe, Howard

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
  • Copyright MIT

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144658
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/144658

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Horne, Amanda. Optimizing Memory-Corruption Security Defenses for Real-Time Systems. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144658