{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/139898"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/139898","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Selling Information in Competitive Environments","abstract":"We consider a setting where data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information, about which a data seller owns some payoff relevant information. We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same time eliciting the private value types of the buyers and collecting payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of binary games. Our results reveal some important features of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from competition among buyers increase the profitability of selling exclusive information to one of the buyers; (ii) in order for the buyers to follow the seller’s action recommendations, the extent of exclusive sales must be limited; (iii) these same equilibrium constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information distortion that can be introduced by a monopolist data seller; (iv) the fiercer the competition across buyers the stronger the previous two limitations, and the weaker the impact of market power on the equilibrium allocation of information.","abstract_html":"We consider a setting where data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information, about which a data seller owns some payoff relevant information. We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same time eliciting the private value types of the buyers and collecting payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of binary games. Our results reveal some important features of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from competition among buyers increase the profitability of selling exclusive information to one of the buyers; (ii) in order for the buyers to follow the seller’s action recommendations, the extent of exclusive sales must be limited; (iii) these same equilibrium constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information distortion that can be introduced by a monopolist data seller; (iv) the fiercer the competition across buyers the stronger the previous two limitations, and the weaker the impact of market power on the equilibrium allocation of information.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Nouripour, Amir"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Dahleh, Munther A."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-09","date_published":"2021-09","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:49Z","subjects":[],"languages":[],"rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright MIT"],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139898","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Dahleh, Munther A."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same time eliciting the private value types of the buyers and collecting payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of binary games. Our results reveal some important features of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from competition among buyers increase the profitability of selling exclusive information to one of the buyers; (ii) in order for the buyers to follow the seller’s action recommendations, the extent of exclusive sales must be limited; (iii) these same equilibrium constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information distortion that can be introduced by a monopolist data seller; (iv) the fiercer the competition across buyers the stronger the previous two limitations, and the weaker the impact of market power on the equilibrium allocation of information."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Selling Information in Competitive Environments"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Dahleh, Munther A."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science"],"dc:creator":["Nouripour, Amir"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2022-02-07T15:11:29Z"],"dc:date.available":["2022-02-07T15:11:29Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2021-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["We consider a setting where data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information, about which a data seller owns some payoff relevant information. We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same time eliciting the private value types of the buyers and collecting payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of binary games. Our results reveal some important features of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from competition among buyers increase the profitability of selling exclusive information to one of the buyers; (ii) in order for the buyers to follow the seller’s action recommendations, the extent of exclusive sales must be limited; (iii) these same equilibrium constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information distortion that can be introduced by a monopolist data seller; (iv) the fiercer the competition across buyers the stronger the previous two limitations, and the weaker the impact of market power on the equilibrium allocation of information."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139898"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted","Copyright MIT"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/"],"dc:title":["Selling Information in Competitive Environments"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master","Master of Science in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:49Z"}