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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Power, Risk, and Democratic Control in State-Local Finance: The Effect of State Tax and Expenditure Limits on Municipal Debt and Risk

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Municipal finance is important, if opaque, to the daily lives of people across the United States. Cities and towns provide essential services which are often financed through debt. Over the course of the 20th century, the use of debt in municipalities and the state-local relationship has transformed dramatically. While debt historically was used for infrastructure projects supported with tax revenue, its use expanded in the postwar era into private purposes and non-capital expenditures. Revenue bonds in particular, a form of non-guaranteed debt, are a popular mechanism to finance local services. States have also increasingly exercised control over municipal finance. Particularly in latter half of the last century, states passed tax and expenditure limits, or TELs, to regulate municipal governments. In this thesis I explore the empirical effects of TELs, particularly limitations on property taxes, on fiscal risk metrics. The study is motivated by the increased financialization of the public sector, and concordant growth in risk in municipal government. How has the state-local relationship contributed to local risk? Using a panel regression with fixed effects on data from all 50 states 1967-2004, I find that TELs have significant effects on municipal risk. Property tax rate limits in particular increase risk, suggesting that some TELs may not constrain the size of local governments, but induce substitution towards higher-risk fiscal practices.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • McDaniel, Noah Jefferson
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Steil, Justin

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
  • Copyright retained by author(s)

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139053
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/139053

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
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citation

McDaniel, Noah Jefferson. Power, Risk, and Democratic Control in State-Local Finance: The Effect of State Tax and Expenditure Limits on Municipal Debt and Risk. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139053