{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/129093"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/129093","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure","abstract":"Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, \"market transparency\") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure.","abstract_html":"Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, "market transparency") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Doctoral","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020","date_published":"2020","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:18Z","subjects":["Sloan School of Management."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided."],"rights_urls":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Sloan School of Management","Sloan"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.other","label":"Dc Contributor Other","values":["Sloan School of Management."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-01-06T17:39:42Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-01-06T17:39:42Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2020"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctoral"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Sloan School of Management."]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020","Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 52-54)."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, \"market transparency\") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph. D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi."],"dc:contributor.department":["Sloan School of Management","Sloan"],"dc:contributor.other":["Sloan School of Management."],"dc:creator":["Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2021-01-06T17:39:42Z"],"dc:date.available":["2021-01-06T17:39:42Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2020"],"dc:description":["Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020","Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 52-54)."],"dc:description.abstract":["Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, \"market transparency\") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph. D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Sloan School of Management."],"dc:title":["The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctoral"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:18Z"}