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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cyber-attack detection and resilient state estimation in power systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Many critical infrastructures, such as transportation and electric energy networks, and health care, are now becoming highly integrated with information and communication technology, in order to be more efficient and reliable. These cyber-physical systems (CPS) now face an increasing threat of cyber-attacks. Intelligent attackers can leverage their knowledge of the system, disruption, and disclosure resources to critically damage the system while remaining undiscovered. In this dissertation, we develop a defense strategy, with the ability to uncover malicious and intelligent attacks and enable resilient operation of cyber-physical systems. Specifically, we apply this defense strategy to power systems, described by linear frequency dynamics around the nominal operating point. Our methodology is based on the notion of data aggregation as a tool for extracting internal information about the system that may be unknown to the attacker. As the first step to resilience and security, we propose several methods for active attack detection in cyber-physical systems. In one approach we design a clustering-based moving-target active detection algorithm and evaluate it against stealthy attacks on the 5-bus and 24-bus power grids. Next, we consider an approach based on Interaction Variables (IntVar), as another intuitive way to extract internal information in power grids. We evaluate the eectiveness of this approach on Automatic Generation Control (AGC), a vital control mechanism in today's power grid. After an attack has been detected, mitigation procedures must be put in place to allow continued reliable operation or graceful degradation of the power grid. To that end, we develop a resilient state estimation algorithm, that provides the system operator with situational awareness in the presence of wide-spread coordinated cyber-attacks when many system measurements may become unavailable.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctoral
Department dc:contributor.department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Jevtić, Ana,Ph. D.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Marija Ilić.

Subjects

dc:subject × 1

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127025
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/127025

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Jevtić, Ana,Ph. D.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.. Cyber-attack detection and resilient state estimation in power systems. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127025