Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe essays in this thesis study the impacts of regulation designed to curtail the accumulation of counterparty credit risk exposure at large banks on intermediation in over-the-counter derivatives markets. In Chapter 1 I analyze the effect on equity holders of regulation focused on exposures held off-balance sheet. While requiring banks to hold capital against their on-balance sheet exposures largely doses not perturb equity holder valuation, capital held against off-balance sheet exposures decreases the equity claim by generating a deleveraging effect when the balance sheet is expanded. Shareholders command a premium to compensate for the change in the value of their claim, leading to a deviation of prices of redundant derivative claims from their replicating portfolios. Importantly, this effect does not appear under a standard leverage ratio.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctoral
- Department dc:contributor.department
- Sloan School of Management
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Goulding, William,Ph. D.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Adrien Verdelhan.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124590
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/124590