{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/124273"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/124273","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Sooner is better : covert action to prevent realignment","abstract":"Why do states intervene covertly in some places and not others? This is a pressing question for theorists and policymakers because covert action is widespread, costly, and consequential. I argue that states wield it-whether by supporting political parties, arming dissidents, sponsoring coups, or assassinating leaders-when they fear that a target is at risk of shifting its alignment toward the state that the intervener considers most threatening. Covert action is a rational response to the threat of realignment. Interveners correctly recognize a window of opportunity: Owing to its circumscribed nature, covert action is more likely to be effective before realignment than after. This means that acting sooner is better. I test this argument in case studies of covert action decision-making by the United States in Indonesia, Iraq, and Portugal. I then conduct a test of the theory's power in a medium-N analysis of 97 cases of serious consideration of such action by the United States during the Cold War. Interveners, I suggest, do not employ covert action as a result of bias on the part of intelligence agencies. Nor do they use it to add to their power. Rather, states act covertly when they fear international realignment.","abstract_html":"Why do states intervene covertly in some places and not others? This is a pressing question for theorists and policymakers because covert action is widespread, costly, and consequential. I argue that states wield it-whether by supporting political parties, arming dissidents, sponsoring coups, or assassinating leaders-when they fear that a target is at risk of shifting its alignment toward the state that the intervener considers most threatening. Covert action is a rational response to the threat of realignment. Interveners correctly recognize a window of opportunity: Owing to its circumscribed nature, covert action is more likely to be effective before realignment than after. This means that acting sooner is better. I test this argument in case studies of covert action decision-making by the United States in Indonesia, Iraq, and Portugal. I then conduct a test of the theory's power in a medium-N analysis of 97 cases of serious consideration of such action by the United States during the Cold War. Interveners, I suggest, do not employ covert action as a result of bias on the part of intelligence agencies. Nor do they use it to add to their power. Rather, states act covertly when they fear international realignment.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Nutt, Cullen Gifford."],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Doctoral","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Barry R. Posen."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019","date_published":"2019","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:06Z","subjects":["Political Science."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. 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I argue that states wield it-whether by supporting political parties, arming dissidents, sponsoring coups, or assassinating leaders-when they fear that a target is at risk of shifting its alignment toward the state that the intervener considers most threatening. Covert action is a rational response to the threat of realignment. Interveners correctly recognize a window of opportunity: Owing to its circumscribed nature, covert action is more likely to be effective before realignment than after. This means that acting sooner is better. I test this argument in case studies of covert action decision-making by the United States in Indonesia, Iraq, and Portugal. I then conduct a test of the theory's power in a medium-N analysis of 97 cases of serious consideration of such action by the United States during the Cold War. Interveners, I suggest, do not employ covert action as a result of bias on the part of intelligence agencies. Nor do they use it to add to their power. Rather, states act covertly when they fear international realignment."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph. D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Sooner is better : covert action to prevent realignment"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Barry R. Posen."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science","PoliSci"],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science."],"dc:creator":["Nutt, Cullen Gifford."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2020-03-24T15:37:25Z"],"dc:date.available":["2020-03-24T15:37:25Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019"],"dc:description":["Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2019","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-308)."],"dc:description.abstract":["Why do states intervene covertly in some places and not others? This is a pressing question for theorists and policymakers because covert action is widespread, costly, and consequential. I argue that states wield it-whether by supporting political parties, arming dissidents, sponsoring coups, or assassinating leaders-when they fear that a target is at risk of shifting its alignment toward the state that the intervener considers most threatening. Covert action is a rational response to the threat of realignment. Interveners correctly recognize a window of opportunity: Owing to its circumscribed nature, covert action is more likely to be effective before realignment than after. This means that acting sooner is better. I test this argument in case studies of covert action decision-making by the United States in Indonesia, Iraq, and Portugal. I then conduct a test of the theory's power in a medium-N analysis of 97 cases of serious consideration of such action by the United States during the Cold War. 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