Beyond gates, guards and guns : the systems-theoretic framework for security at nuclear facilities

Current approaches to nuclear security can produce elegantly designed physical protection systems (PPS) that may be limited by untenable assumptions or well stated-albeit vague and imprecise-descriptions of how to improve nuclear security culture itself. According to one nuclear security culture expert: While the International Atomic Energy Agency has released methodologies on evaluating vulnerabilities and physical protection, it has not yet introduced guidelines on assessing the human-factor in detection, delay, and response. (Khripunov, 2014, pp. 39-40) (Emphasis added) This dissertation argues that such a link lies in understanding how organizational influences affect the completion of tasks required for PPS to meet expected nuclear security performance goals. In this dissertation, I propose the System-Theoretic Framework for Security (the STFS) for evaluating system-level interactions between PPS and human/organizational behaviors to describe overall security performance.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctoral

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2018

Author dc:creator

• Williams, Adam D.(Adam David),Ph. D.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• John S. Carroll.

• Institute for Data, Systems, and Society.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122900

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/122900