Calculating bully : explaining Chinese coercion

Since 1990, China has used coercion for territorial disputes, foreign arms sales to Taiwan, and foreign leaders' meetings with the Dalai Lama, despite adverse implications for its international image. China is also curiously selective in the timing, target, and tools of coercion: most cases of Chinese coercion are not military coercion, nor does China use coercion against all states that pose the same threats to its national security. The question regarding China's coercion patterns -- crucial for the prospect of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and critical for understanding states' use of coercion -- has not been systematically answered. My dissertation therefore examines when, why and how China attempts to coerce states over perceived threats to its national security. This question entails two parts: 1) when and why does China choose coercion, and 2) if coercion is chosen, what tools does China utilize? I explain Chinese coercion with the cost balancing theory --

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2018

Author dc:creator

• Zhang, Ketian.

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• M. Taylor Fravel.

• Political Science.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng