{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/122392"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/122392","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs","abstract":"The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).","abstract_html":"The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology."],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Silvio Micali."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017","date_published":"2017","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:34Z","subjects":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."],"rights_urls":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Silvio Micali."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","EECS"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.other","label":"Dc Contributor Other","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2019-10-04T21:31:55Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-10-04T21:31:55Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2017"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.","Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017","Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (page 25)."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann)."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["M. Eng."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Silvio Micali."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","EECS"],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"dc:creator":["Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-10-04T21:31:55Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-10-04T21:31:55Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2017"],"dc:description":["This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.","Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017","Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (page 25)."],"dc:description.abstract":["The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann)."],"dc:description.degree":["M. Eng."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"dc:title":["Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:34Z"}