Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis thesis consists of three essays. The first essay explores a form of bounded rationality where agents learn about the economy with possibly misspecified models. I consider a recursive general-equilibrium framework that nests a large class of macroeconomic models. Misspecification is represented as a constraint on the set of beliefs agents can entertain. I introduce the solution concept of constrained-rational-expectations equilibrium (CREE), in which each agent selects the belief from her constrained set that is closest to the endogenous distribution of observables in the Kullback-Leibler divergence. If the set of permissible beliefs contains the rational-expectations equilibria (REE), then the REE are CREE; otherwise, they are not. I show that a CREE exists, that it arises naturally as the limit of adaptive and Bayesian learning, and that it incorporates a version of the Lucas critique.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Doctoral
- Department dc:contributor.department
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Molavi, Pooya.
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Ivan Werning, Daron Acemoglu and Drew Fudenberg.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122111
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/122111