{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/121833"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/121833","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Uncertainty and individual discretion in allocating research funds","abstract":"There is a long-standing tradition in public research funding agencies of distributing funds via peer review, which aggregates evaluations of proposed research ideas from a group of external experts. Despite complaints that this process is biased against novel ideas, there is poor understanding of an alternative system that may overcome this bias: the use of individual discretion. Here, we conduct the first quantitative study of how individual discretion affects a research funding portfolio. Using internal project selection data from the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), we describe how a portfolio of projects selected by individual discretion differs from a portfolio of projects selected by traditional peer review. We show that ARPA-E program directors prefer to fund proposals with greater disagreement among experts, especially if at least one reviewer thinks highly of the proposal. This preference leads ARPA-E to fund more uncertain and creative research ideas, which supports the agency's mission of pursuing novel ideas for transformational energy technology.","abstract_html":"There is a long-standing tradition in public research funding agencies of distributing funds via peer review, which aggregates evaluations of proposed research ideas from a group of external experts. Despite complaints that this process is biased against novel ideas, there is poor understanding of an alternative system that may overcome this bias: the use of individual discretion. Here, we conduct the first quantitative study of how individual discretion affects a research funding portfolio. Using internal project selection data from the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), we describe how a portfolio of projects selected by individual discretion differs from a portfolio of projects selected by traditional peer review. We show that ARPA-E program directors prefer to fund proposals with greater disagreement among experts, especially if at least one reviewer thinks highly of the proposal. This preference leads ARPA-E to fund more uncertain and creative research ideas, which supports the agency's mission of pursuing novel ideas for transformational energy technology.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kearney, Michael J.(Michael Joseph)"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Pierre Azoulay."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019","date_published":"2019","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:46Z","subjects":["Sloan School of Management."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. 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They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121833"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2019","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 31-34)."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["There is a long-standing tradition in public research funding agencies of distributing funds via peer review, which aggregates evaluations of proposed research ideas from a group of external experts. Despite complaints that this process is biased against novel ideas, there is poor understanding of an alternative system that may overcome this bias: the use of individual discretion. Here, we conduct the first quantitative study of how individual discretion affects a research funding portfolio. Using internal project selection data from the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), we describe how a portfolio of projects selected by individual discretion differs from a portfolio of projects selected by traditional peer review. We show that ARPA-E program directors prefer to fund proposals with greater disagreement among experts, especially if at least one reviewer thinks highly of the proposal. This preference leads ARPA-E to fund more uncertain and creative research ideas, which supports the agency's mission of pursuing novel ideas for transformational energy technology."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M. in Management Research"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Uncertainty and individual discretion in allocating research funds"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Pierre Azoulay."],"dc:contributor.department":["Sloan School of Management","Sloan"],"dc:contributor.other":["Sloan School of Management."],"dc:creator":["Kearney, Michael J.(Michael Joseph)"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-07-18T20:34:51Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-07-18T20:34:51Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2019"],"dc:description":["Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2019","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 31-34)."],"dc:description.abstract":["There is a long-standing tradition in public research funding agencies of distributing funds via peer review, which aggregates evaluations of proposed research ideas from a group of external experts. Despite complaints that this process is biased against novel ideas, there is poor understanding of an alternative system that may overcome this bias: the use of individual discretion. Here, we conduct the first quantitative study of how individual discretion affects a research funding portfolio. Using internal project selection data from the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), we describe how a portfolio of projects selected by individual discretion differs from a portfolio of projects selected by traditional peer review. We show that ARPA-E program directors prefer to fund proposals with greater disagreement among experts, especially if at least one reviewer thinks highly of the proposal. This preference leads ARPA-E to fund more uncertain and creative research ideas, which supports the agency's mission of pursuing novel ideas for transformational energy technology."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M. in Management Research"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/121833"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Sloan School of Management."],"dc:title":["Uncertainty and individual discretion in allocating research funds"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:20:46Z"}