{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/121686"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/121686","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Improving security at the system-call boundary in a type-safe operating system","abstract":"Historically, most approaches to operating sytems security aim to either protect the kernel (e.g., the MMU) or protect user applications (e.g., W [symbol] X). However, little study has been done into protecting the boundary between these layers. We describe a vulnerability in Tock, a type-safe operating system, at the system-call boundary. We then introduce a technique for providing memory safety at the boundary between userland and the kernel in Tock. 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We demonstrate that this technique works to prevent against the aforementioned vulnerability and a class of similar vulnerabilities, and we propose how it might be used to protect against simliar vulnerabilities in other operating systems.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Weisblat, Jakob H."],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":"Master","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Howard Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi and Bryan Ward."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019","date_published":"2019","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:02Z","subjects":["Electrical Engineering and Computer Science."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. 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We demonstrate that this technique works to prevent against the aforementioned vulnerability and a class of similar vulnerabilities, and we propose how it might be used to protect against simliar vulnerabilities in other operating systems."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["M. Eng."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Improving security at the system-call boundary in a type-safe operating system"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Howard Shrobe, Hamed Okhravi and Bryan Ward."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science","EECS"],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 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