{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/120677"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/120677","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Ethics for artificial agents","abstract":"Machine ethics is a nascent subfield of computer ethics that focuses on the ethical issues involved in the design of autonomous software agents (\"artificial agents\"). Chapter 1 of this thesis considers how best to understand the central projects of this new subfield, and reconstructs a prominent theory of how artificial agents ought to be designed. This theory, which I call the \"agential theory\" of machine ethics, says that artificial agents morally ought to be designed to behave only in ways that would be permissible for a human agent to behave, and that only artificial agents that have been designed in this way are morally permissible for human beings to use. Chapter 2 critically assesses two versions of the agential theory-one that assumes that artificial agents are moral agents, and another that does not. After considering arguments for both versions of the theory, I argue that both versions should be rejected. Chapter 3 sets out and analyzes a case study in machine ethics, focusing on the development of an artificial agent to assist with the planning of a public health social work intervention.","abstract_html":"Machine ethics is a nascent subfield of computer ethics that focuses on the ethical issues involved in the design of autonomous software agents ("artificial agents"). Chapter 1 of this thesis considers how best to understand the central projects of this new subfield, and reconstructs a prominent theory of how artificial agents ought to be designed. This theory, which I call the "agential theory" of machine ethics, says that artificial agents morally ought to be designed to behave only in ways that would be permissible for a human agent to behave, and that only artificial agents that have been designed in this way are morally permissible for human beings to use. Chapter 2 critically assesses two versions of the agential theory-one that assumes that artificial agents are moral agents, and another that does not. After considering arguments for both versions of the theory, I argue that both versions should be rejected. Chapter 3 sets out and analyzes a case study in machine ethics, focusing on the development of an artificial agent to assist with the planning of a public health social work intervention.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gray, David Michael, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Alex Byrne."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018","date_published":"2018","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:29Z","subjects":["Linguistics and Philosophy."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."],"rights_urls":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120677","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Alex Byrne."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.other","label":"Dc Contributor Other","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gray, David Michael, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2019-03-01T19:57:25Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-03-01T19:57:25Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2018"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Linguistics and Philosophy."]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120677"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis: Ph. D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2018.","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 121-125)."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Machine ethics is a nascent subfield of computer ethics that focuses on the ethical issues involved in the design of autonomous software agents (\"artificial agents\"). Chapter 1 of this thesis considers how best to understand the central projects of this new subfield, and reconstructs a prominent theory of how artificial agents ought to be designed. This theory, which I call the \"agential theory\" of machine ethics, says that artificial agents morally ought to be designed to behave only in ways that would be permissible for a human agent to behave, and that only artificial agents that have been designed in this way are morally permissible for human beings to use. Chapter 2 critically assesses two versions of the agential theory-one that assumes that artificial agents are moral agents, and another that does not. After considering arguments for both versions of the theory, I argue that both versions should be rejected. Chapter 3 sets out and analyzes a case study in machine ethics, focusing on the development of an artificial agent to assist with the planning of a public health social work intervention."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph. D. in Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Ethics for artificial agents"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Alex Byrne."],"dc:contributor.department":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy."],"dc:contributor.other":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy."],"dc:creator":["Gray, David Michael, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2019-03-01T19:57:25Z"],"dc:date.available":["2019-03-01T19:57:25Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2018"],"dc:description":["Thesis: Ph. D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2018.","Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.","Includes bibliographical references (pages 121-125)."],"dc:description.abstract":["Machine ethics is a nascent subfield of computer ethics that focuses on the ethical issues involved in the design of autonomous software agents (\"artificial agents\"). Chapter 1 of this thesis considers how best to understand the central projects of this new subfield, and reconstructs a prominent theory of how artificial agents ought to be designed. This theory, which I call the \"agential theory\" of machine ethics, says that artificial agents morally ought to be designed to behave only in ways that would be permissible for a human agent to behave, and that only artificial agents that have been designed in this way are morally permissible for human beings to use. Chapter 2 critically assesses two versions of the agential theory-one that assumes that artificial agents are moral agents, and another that does not. After considering arguments for both versions of the theory, I argue that both versions should be rejected. Chapter 3 sets out and analyzes a case study in machine ethics, focusing on the development of an artificial agent to assist with the planning of a public health social work intervention."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph. D. in Philosophy"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120677"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582"],"dc:subject":["Linguistics and Philosophy."],"dc:title":["Ethics for artificial agents"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:22:29Z"}