Abstract
dc:description.abstractWeb services like Google, Facebook, and Dropbox are a regular part of users' lives. However, using these applications can cause sensitive data leakage both on the server and client. On the server-side, applications collect and analyze sensitive user data to monetize it. Consequently, this sensitive data can leak through data breaches or can be accessed by malicious service providers. On the client, when a user accesses a web service through the browser, sensitive user information may leak outside of the browser, e.g., to DNS interfaces or the swap space. An attacker who accesses the user device after a session has terminated can view this information. This dissertation presents two practical, secure systems, Veil and Splinter, that prevent some of this data leakage. Veil minimizes client-side information leakage from the browser by allowing web application developers to enforce stronger private browsing semantics without browser support. Splinter allows the server to properly respond to a user query without the server learning any sensitive information present in the query.
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
- Grantor dc:publisher
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2018
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Wang, Frank Yi-Fei
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Nickolai Zeldovich and James Mickens.
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
- Licence dc:rights.uri
- Language dc:language.iso
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120410
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/120410