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Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Growing Pains in financial development : institutional weakness and investment efficiency

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

There is little evidence that the expansion of microfinance has reduced poverty, but is instead increasingly associated with problematic multiple borrowing at high interest rates and high levels of debt and default. We develop a model that rationalizes these outcomes-if entrepreneurs cannot commit to exclusive borrowing from a single lender, expanding financial access by introducing multiple lenders may severely backfire. Capital allocation is distorted away from the most productive uses. Entrepreneurs choose inefficient and limited-growth endeavors. These problems are exacerbated when borrowers have access to more lenders, explaining why increased access to finance does not always improve outcomes.

Degree

thesis:*
Department dc:contributor.department
Sloan School of Management.
Grantor dc:publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year dc:date.issued
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Authors dc:creator
  • Green, Daniel (Daniel Weiss)
  • Liu, Ernest Siyuan
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Daron Acemoglu and Jonathan Parker.

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113949
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/113949

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
MIT
Base URL
dspace.mit.edu/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-22
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Green, Daniel (Daniel Weiss); Liu, Ernest Siyuan. Growing Pains in financial development : institutional weakness and investment efficiency. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113949