{"id":{"repo_id":"mit","oai_identifier":"oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/112021"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mit/oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/112021","repository":{"repo_id":"mit","name":"MIT","base_url":"https://dspace.mit.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities","abstract":"Information about one firm has the potential to affect the stock price of another firm. I investigate whether managers recognize this potential and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms.","abstract_html":"Information about one firm has the potential to affect the stock price of another firm. I investigate whether managers recognize this potential and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kim, Jinhwan"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management.","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Rodrigo S. Verdi and Eric C. So."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017","date_published":"2017","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:36Z","subjects":["Sloan School of Management."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. 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I investigate whether managers recognize this potential and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["S.M. in Management Research"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Rodrigo S. Verdi and Eric C. 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Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms."],"dc:description.degree":["S.M. in Management Research"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112021"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Massachusetts Institute of Technology"],"dc:rights":["MIT theses are protected by copyright. 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