Essays in informal finance and market design under weak institutions

1. Keeping the Little Guy Down: A Debt Trap for Informal Lending -- 2. Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design In The Field -- 3. Voluntary Market Design: Dominant Individual Rationality.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2017

Author dc:creator

• Roth, Benjamin N. (Benjamin Nathaniel)

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Abhijit Banerjee and Daron Acemoglu.

• Economics.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/111361

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/111361