Negotiation strategies in American-North Korean nuclear talks, 1992-2013

North Korea's relationship with nuclear technology has concerned the world for decades. A wide array of negotiation methods from punitive sanctions to energy assistance have been attempted to dissuade the nation from developing its weapons program -- but every resolution has been temporary at best. We focus on the United States' negotiation strategy and attempt to uncover inconsistencies between it and the material facts of the North Korean situation. The historical record of past negotiations and rhetoric used by each party during previous attempts are considered in our analysis, in order to construct a picture of diplomatic evolution over time. We believe that the North Korean bargaining position -- which has been highly consistent across decades of cyclic negotiating behavior -- is fundamentally incompatible with US demands for complete denuclearization.

Department dc:contributor.department

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering.

Grantor dc:publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Brandt-Erichsen, Haley

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• R. Scott Kemp.

• Nuclear Science and Engineering.

Statement dc:rights

• MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.

Licence dc:rights.uri

• http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582

Language dc:language.iso

eng

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106699

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/106699