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These results are consistent with firms using high-quality financial reporting to reduce information asymmetry even in the absence of regulation as a bonding mechanism.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Anderson, Joshua David"],"institution":"Massachusetts Institute of Technology","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Sloan School of Management.","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["John E. Core and Joseph Weber."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015","date_published":"2015","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:21:32Z","subjects":["Sloan School of Management."],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. 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