{"id":{"repo_id":"missouri","oai_identifier":"oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/44265"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/missouri/oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/44265","repository":{"repo_id":"missouri","name":"University of Missouri","base_url":"https://mospace.umsystem.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Economic sanctions, resource wealth, and increased state utility","abstract":"Economic sanctions have become an important tool in the hands of world leaders. As globalization has made the world a smaller place and increased the economic ties between nations; economic sanctions have become a preferred method of coercion among the economic powers of the world. As of today, the literature on economic sanctions has largely concentrated on the overall effectiveness of economic sanctions, generally arguing that economic sanctions are ineffective. But as the literature has expanded, scholars have begun to ask the question; why do we see sanctions work in some cases and fail in others? The author of this piece provides empirical evidence that natural resource wealth increases the capacity of targeted states to persevere the negative cost associated with the implementation of economic sanctions.","abstract_html":"Economic sanctions have become an important tool in the hands of world leaders. As globalization has made the world a smaller place and increased the economic ties between nations; economic sanctions have become a preferred method of coercion among the economic powers of the world. As of today, the literature on economic sanctions has largely concentrated on the overall effectiveness of economic sanctions, generally arguing that economic sanctions are ineffective. But as the literature has expanded, scholars have begun to ask the question; why do we see sanctions work in some cases and fail in others? The author of this piece provides empirical evidence that natural resource wealth increases the capacity of targeted states to persevere the negative cost associated with the implementation of economic sanctions.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ernst, Travis"],"institution":"University of Missouri--Columbia","degree_name":"M.A.","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Political science (MU)","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Drury, A. Cooper, 1967-"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014","date_published":"2014","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:08:32Z","subjects":[],"languages":["eng","English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/44265"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/44265","href":"https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/44265","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10355/44265","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Drury, A. 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Cooper Drury."]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Economic sanctions have become an important tool in the hands of world leaders. As globalization has made the world a smaller place and increased the economic ties between nations; economic sanctions have become a preferred method of coercion among the economic powers of the world. As of today, the literature on economic sanctions has largely concentrated on the overall effectiveness of economic sanctions, generally arguing that economic sanctions are ineffective. But as the literature has expanded, scholars have begun to ask the question; why do we see sanctions work in some cases and fail in others? The author of this piece provides empirical evidence that natural resource wealth increases the capacity of targeted states to persevere the negative cost associated with the implementation of economic sanctions."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Economic sanctions, resource wealth, and increased state utility"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Drury, A. Cooper, 1967-"],"dc:creator":["Ernst, Travis"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-11-14T20:04:12Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-11-14T20:04:12Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2014"],"dc:description":["\"May 2014.\"","Committee Chair: Dr. A. Cooper Drury."],"dc:description.abstract":["Economic sanctions have become an important tool in the hands of world leaders. As globalization has made the world a smaller place and increased the economic ties between nations; economic sanctions have become a preferred method of coercion among the economic powers of the world. As of today, the literature on economic sanctions has largely concentrated on the overall effectiveness of economic sanctions, generally arguing that economic sanctions are ineffective. But as the literature has expanded, scholars have begun to ask the question; why do we see sanctions work in some cases and fail in others? The author of this piece provides empirical evidence that natural resource wealth increases the capacity of targeted states to persevere the negative cost associated with the implementation of economic sanctions."],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/44265"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10355/44265"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["University of Missouri--Columbia"],"dc:title":["Economic sanctions, resource wealth, and increased state utility"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Political science (MU)"],"thesis:degree_level":["Masters"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:08:32Z"}