{"id":{"repo_id":"missouri","oai_identifier":"oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/15083"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/missouri/oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/15083","repository":{"repo_id":"missouri","name":"University of Missouri","base_url":"https://mospace.umsystem.edu/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Choice, ownership and responsibility","abstract":"My dissertation is to answer these two questions: \"Does moral responsibility require choice?\" and \"If not, what does it require?\" Classic accounts of moral responsibility, such as libertarian accounts, assume a volition condition - we are not morally responsible for a behavior unless we have directly or indirectly chosen it. I call this view volitionism. Non-volitionism, on the other hand, claims that no such choice is necessary for moral responsibility. I propose and defend a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility. I first argue against volitionism by comparing a paradigm case of choice with some typical cases of non-choice mental activities and showing that no responsibility-generating power can be found uniquely in choice. Then, I examine some current non-volitionist accounts and argue that they all face a serious challenge - the Problem of Brain Manipulation. Finally, based on what I call the normative Strawsonian framework, I propose a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility that meets this challenge. According to my account, moral responsibility for a behavior requires that, roughly, the behavior be caused by a certain evaluative attitude or judgment of which the agent can claim deep ownership.","abstract_html":"My dissertation is to answer these two questions: "Does moral responsibility require choice?" and "If not, what does it require?" Classic accounts of moral responsibility, such as libertarian accounts, assume a volition condition - we are not morally responsible for a behavior unless we have directly or indirectly chosen it. I call this view volitionism. Non-volitionism, on the other hand, claims that no such choice is necessary for moral responsibility. I propose and defend a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility. I first argue against volitionism by comparing a paradigm case of choice with some typical cases of non-choice mental activities and showing that no responsibility-generating power can be found uniquely in choice. Then, I examine some current non-volitionist accounts and argue that they all face a serious challenge - the Problem of Brain Manipulation. Finally, based on what I call the normative Strawsonian framework, I propose a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility that meets this challenge. According to my account, moral responsibility for a behavior requires that, roughly, the behavior be caused by a certain evaluative attitude or judgment of which the agent can claim deep ownership.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Liu, Xiaofei"],"institution":"University of Missouri--Columbia","degree_name":"Ph. D.","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy (MU)","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Vallentyne, Peter"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012","date_published":"2012","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:08:43Z","subjects":["moral responsibility","choice","non-volitionism","compatibilism"],"languages":["eng","English"],"rights":["OpenAccess."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/15083"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/15083","href":"https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/15083","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/10355/15083","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Vallentyne, Peter"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Liu, Xiaofei"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2012-08-29T18:47:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2012-08-29T18:47:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2012"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy (MU)"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph. D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["moral responsibility","choice","non-volitionism","compatibilism"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["OpenAccess."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/15083"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/10355/15083"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on August 29, 2012).","The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.","Dissertation advisor: Dr. Peter Vallentyne","Includes bibliographical references.","Vita.","Ph. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2012","\"May 2012\""]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["My dissertation is to answer these two questions: \"Does moral responsibility require choice?\" and \"If not, what does it require?\" Classic accounts of moral responsibility, such as libertarian accounts, assume a volition condition - we are not morally responsible for a behavior unless we have directly or indirectly chosen it. I call this view volitionism. Non-volitionism, on the other hand, claims that no such choice is necessary for moral responsibility. I propose and defend a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility. I first argue against volitionism by comparing a paradigm case of choice with some typical cases of non-choice mental activities and showing that no responsibility-generating power can be found uniquely in choice. Then, I examine some current non-volitionist accounts and argue that they all face a serious challenge - the Problem of Brain Manipulation. Finally, based on what I call the normative Strawsonian framework, I propose a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility that meets this challenge. According to my account, moral responsibility for a behavior requires that, roughly, the behavior be caused by a certain evaluative attitude or judgment of which the agent can claim deep ownership."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Choice, ownership and responsibility"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Vallentyne, Peter"],"dc:creator":["Liu, Xiaofei"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2012-08-29T18:47:53Z"],"dc:date.available":["2012-08-29T18:47:53Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2012"],"dc:description":["Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on August 29, 2012).","The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.","Dissertation advisor: Dr. Peter Vallentyne","Includes bibliographical references.","Vita.","Ph. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2012","\"May 2012\""],"dc:description.abstract":["My dissertation is to answer these two questions: \"Does moral responsibility require choice?\" and \"If not, what does it require?\" Classic accounts of moral responsibility, such as libertarian accounts, assume a volition condition - we are not morally responsible for a behavior unless we have directly or indirectly chosen it. I call this view volitionism. Non-volitionism, on the other hand, claims that no such choice is necessary for moral responsibility. I propose and defend a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility. I first argue against volitionism by comparing a paradigm case of choice with some typical cases of non-choice mental activities and showing that no responsibility-generating power can be found uniquely in choice. Then, I examine some current non-volitionist accounts and argue that they all face a serious challenge - the Problem of Brain Manipulation. Finally, based on what I call the normative Strawsonian framework, I propose a non-volitionist account of moral responsibility that meets this challenge. According to my account, moral responsibility for a behavior requires that, roughly, the behavior be caused by a certain evaluative attitude or judgment of which the agent can claim deep ownership."],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/15083"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/10355/15083"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["University of Missouri--Columbia"],"dc:rights":["OpenAccess."],"dc:subject":["moral responsibility","choice","non-volitionism","compatibilism"],"dc:title":["Choice, ownership and responsibility"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy (MU)"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph. D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Missouri--Columbia"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:08:43Z"}