Against moral unconditionalism

One of the most important normative questions is whether an agent ought to prioritize morality (by "ought" I mean the unqualified "ought," not qualified oughts like "morally ought," "prudentially ought," etc.). To put it differently, if an agent encounters a state of affairs where she can either follow morality or do something else, but not both, then which option should the agent choose? It is common for philosophers to side with morality, and to think that all agents ought to follow morality even if doing so prevents the agent from doing something else. This view is known as moral unconditionalism. The purpose of this dissertation is to question moral unconditionalism. Although many philosophers take moral unconditionalism for granted, I do not. In this dissertation, I criticize three arguments for moral unconditionalism. The arguments are given by philosophers that are notable representatives of three major ethical theories (utilitarianism, divine command theory, and libertarianism, respectively). By criticizing their arguments for moral unconditionalism, I hope to show that moral unconditionalism is neither as justified nor as obvious as many people think it is, and that people ought to try to argue for moral unconditionalism instead of taking it for granted.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph. D.

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Grantor dc:publisher

University of Missouri--Columbia

Year dc:date.issued

2025

Author dc:creator

• Quintaneiro, Arcangelo Sforcim Pereira

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Weirich, Paul

Language dc:language.iso

eng, English

DOI

https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/109497

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:mospace.umsystem.edu:10355/109497