Berkeley on the Source of Self-Knowledge: Introspection and Causal Maxim

Most Berkeley commentators agree that Berkeley’s theory of self-awareness depends on some type of direct introspective access to the self. In this paper, I challenge this consensus view, arguing that Berkeley’s theory does not claim that there is direct introspective access to the self until after his first publication of the Principles of Human Knowledge in 1710. The first edition of the Principles, as well as Berkeley’s Philosophical Notebooks, reveal a significantly different, perhaps more “Humean,” perspective concerning self-awareness than his works after 1710. During this period, Berkeley thought that the self cannot be encountered directly through introspection, but is in fact knowable only by means of an inference which integrates a crucial causal maxim. Further, I argue that Berkeley thought the causal maxim which grounds his argument for the existence of the self is itself grounded in experience. Berkeley’s early position on self-knowledge interestingly anticipates Hume’s criticism of the introspective availability of the self while denying any skepticism concerning causation.

Name thesis:degree_name

M.A. in Philosophy

Level thesis:degree_level

Thesis

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy and Religion

Year dc:date.available

2016

Author dc:creator

• Harkema, Scott

Contributors dc:contributor

• Timothy P. Yenter
• Steven Skultety
• Donovan Wishon

• Causation
• David Hume
• George Berkeley
• Personal Identity
• Self-Awareness
• Self-Knowledge
• Philosophy

Repository record dc:identifier

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1211

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:egrove.olemiss.edu:etd-2210