One comtheory of persistence is that things move through time as wholly present entities, moving from time to time as a complete unit. This theory, the endurance theory, has come under challenge by various authors, and this paper will defend the view from one such objection. Katherine Hawley argues that the endurance theory fails to account for vague persistence on the grounds that endurance cannot account for vagueness semantically. I will show that this claim is based on an assumption of classical logic and that by rejecting this assumption in favor of a non-classical logic the objection is rendered mute. By revising our understanding of the identity relation to function on a continuum scale we can understand persistence as a scalar function that can be labeled as true false or any value in between. This reinterpretation of the identity relation will allow an endurance theorist to account for vague persistence semantically and thereby reject the objection from Hawley.
","abstract_html":"<p>One comtheory of persistence is that things move through time as wholly present entities, moving from time to time as a complete unit. This theory, the endurance theory, has come under challenge by various authors, and this paper will defend the view from one such objection. Katherine Hawley argues that the endurance theory fails to account for vague persistence on the grounds that endurance cannot account for vagueness semantically. I will show that this claim is based on an assumption of classical logic and that by rejecting this assumption in favor of a non-classical logic the objection is rendered mute. By revising our understanding of the identity relation to function on a continuum scale we can understand persistence as a scalar function that can be labeled as true false or any value in between. This reinterpretation of the identity relation will allow an endurance theorist to account for vague persistence semantically and thereby reject the objection from Hawley.</p>","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Waite, Seth"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"M.A. in Philosophy","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Philosophy and Religion","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Donovan Wishon","Robert Barnard","Timothy P. Yenter"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2016,"date_issued":"2016-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2016-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:06:21Z","subjects":["Endurance","Language","Non-Classical Logic","Semantics","Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1107","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Donovan Wishon","Robert Barnard","Timothy P. Yenter"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Waite, Seth"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-06-20T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy and Religion"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.A. in Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Endurance","Language","Non-Classical Logic","Semantics","Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1107"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["One comtheory of persistence is that things move through time as wholly present entities, moving from time to time as a complete unit. This theory, the endurance theory, has come under challenge by various authors, and this paper will defend the view from one such objection. Katherine Hawley argues that the endurance theory fails to account for vague persistence on the grounds that endurance cannot account for vagueness semantically. I will show that this claim is based on an assumption of classical logic and that by rejecting this assumption in favor of a non-classical logic the objection is rendered mute. By revising our understanding of the identity relation to function on a continuum scale we can understand persistence as a scalar function that can be labeled as true false or any value in between. This reinterpretation of the identity relation will allow an endurance theorist to account for vague persistence semantically and thereby reject the objection from Hawley.
"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A Non-Classical Solution To Vague Persistence"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Donovan Wishon","Robert Barnard","Timothy P. Yenter"],"dc:creator":["Waite, Seth"],"dc:date.available":["2019-06-20T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["One comtheory of persistence is that things move through time as wholly present entities, moving from time to time as a complete unit. This theory, the endurance theory, has come under challenge by various authors, and this paper will defend the view from one such objection. Katherine Hawley argues that the endurance theory fails to account for vague persistence on the grounds that endurance cannot account for vagueness semantically. I will show that this claim is based on an assumption of classical logic and that by rejecting this assumption in favor of a non-classical logic the objection is rendered mute. By revising our understanding of the identity relation to function on a continuum scale we can understand persistence as a scalar function that can be labeled as true false or any value in between. This reinterpretation of the identity relation will allow an endurance theorist to account for vague persistence semantically and thereby reject the objection from Hawley.
"],"dc:identifier":["https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1107"],"dc:subject":["Endurance","Language","Non-Classical Logic","Semantics","Philosophy"],"dc:title":["A Non-Classical Solution To Vague Persistence"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy and Religion"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A. in Philosophy"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:06:21Z"}