{"id":{"repo_id":"mississippi","oai_identifier":"oai:egrove.olemiss.edu:etd-2105"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mississippi/oai:egrove.olemiss.edu:etd-2105","repository":{"repo_id":"mississippi","name":"University of Mississippi","base_url":"https://egrove.olemiss.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"A Critical Examination Of Understanding’s Characteristics: Why, In A Sense, Understanding Is Unique","abstract":"Is understanding a unique kind of epistemic state or simply another word for knowledge? Recently, there is a dispute in the literature between those, non-reductionists, who argue that we cannot reduce understanding to knowledge. Sliwa and Khalifa, two reductionists, on the other hand, argue that understanding is basically just another word for knowledge (if we are fairly comparing the two). After considering the dialectic between non-reductionists and reductionists, undogmatically, I argue that Sliwa's arguments in favor of reductionism fail. Sliwa's analytical argument in defense of reductionism is unsuccessful because a special kind of understanding, subjective understanding, can be independent of knowledge. And, Sliwa's background argument in defense of reductionism fails because there can be epistemic asymmetries in skeptical scenarios. So, my thesis is that understanding is not necessarily reducible to knowledge. After all, a certain kind of understanding, subjective understanding, is both non-factive and compatible with certain kinds of epistemic luck, unlike knowledge. Understanding, in a sense, is unique.","abstract_html":"Is understanding a unique kind of epistemic state or simply another word for knowledge? Recently, there is a dispute in the literature between those, non-reductionists, who argue that we cannot reduce understanding to knowledge. Sliwa and Khalifa, two reductionists, on the other hand, argue that understanding is basically just another word for knowledge (if we are fairly comparing the two). After considering the dialectic between non-reductionists and reductionists, undogmatically, I argue that Sliwa's arguments in favor of reductionism fail. Sliwa's analytical argument in defense of reductionism is unsuccessful because a special kind of understanding, subjective understanding, can be independent of knowledge. And, Sliwa's background argument in defense of reductionism fails because there can be epistemic asymmetries in skeptical scenarios. So, my thesis is that understanding is not necessarily reducible to knowledge. After all, a certain kind of understanding, subjective understanding, is both non-factive and compatible with certain kinds of epistemic luck, unlike knowledge. Understanding, in a sense, is unique.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Becker, Christopher"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"M.A. in Philosophy","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Philosophy and Religion","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Robert Barnard","Robert Westmoreland","Donovan Wishon"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2018-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:06:21Z","subjects":["Contrastive Underdetermination","Epistemic Value","Knowledge","Reductionism","Understanding","Epistemology"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1106","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Robert Barnard","Robert Westmoreland","Donovan Wishon"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Becker, Christopher"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2019-06-20T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy and Religion"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.A. in Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Contrastive Underdetermination","Epistemic Value","Knowledge","Reductionism","Understanding","Epistemology"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1106"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Is understanding a unique kind of epistemic state or simply another word for knowledge? Recently, there is a dispute in the literature between those, non-reductionists, who argue that we cannot reduce understanding to knowledge. Sliwa and Khalifa, two reductionists, on the other hand, argue that understanding is basically just another word for knowledge (if we are fairly comparing the two). After considering the dialectic between non-reductionists and reductionists, undogmatically, I argue that Sliwa's arguments in favor of reductionism fail. Sliwa's analytical argument in defense of reductionism is unsuccessful because a special kind of understanding, subjective understanding, can be independent of knowledge. And, Sliwa's background argument in defense of reductionism fails because there can be epistemic asymmetries in skeptical scenarios. So, my thesis is that understanding is not necessarily reducible to knowledge. After all, a certain kind of understanding, subjective understanding, is both non-factive and compatible with certain kinds of epistemic luck, unlike knowledge. Understanding, in a sense, is unique."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A Critical Examination Of Understanding’s Characteristics: Why, In A Sense, Understanding Is Unique"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Robert Barnard","Robert Westmoreland","Donovan Wishon"],"dc:creator":["Becker, Christopher"],"dc:date.available":["2019-06-20T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Is understanding a unique kind of epistemic state or simply another word for knowledge? Recently, there is a dispute in the literature between those, non-reductionists, who argue that we cannot reduce understanding to knowledge. Sliwa and Khalifa, two reductionists, on the other hand, argue that understanding is basically just another word for knowledge (if we are fairly comparing the two). After considering the dialectic between non-reductionists and reductionists, undogmatically, I argue that Sliwa's arguments in favor of reductionism fail. Sliwa's analytical argument in defense of reductionism is unsuccessful because a special kind of understanding, subjective understanding, can be independent of knowledge. And, Sliwa's background argument in defense of reductionism fails because there can be epistemic asymmetries in skeptical scenarios. So, my thesis is that understanding is not necessarily reducible to knowledge. After all, a certain kind of understanding, subjective understanding, is both non-factive and compatible with certain kinds of epistemic luck, unlike knowledge. Understanding, in a sense, is unique."],"dc:identifier":["https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1106"],"dc:subject":["Contrastive Underdetermination","Epistemic Value","Knowledge","Reductionism","Understanding","Epistemology"],"dc:title":["A Critical Examination Of Understanding’s Characteristics: Why, In A Sense, Understanding Is Unique"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy and Religion"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.A. in Philosophy"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T03:06:21Z"}