Demands And Offers In Ultimatum Games

Pecorino and Van Boening (2010) introduce the embedded ultimatum game. The authors embed an ultimatum game into a stylized legal bargaining framework and cross analyze the offer and dispute behavior in this game with the same behavior in a baseline simple ultimatum game. The current study seeks to test the replicability of a computerized version of these games. Additionally, variations of the two games are introduced here to test the effects of specific manipulation of the framing of the simple ultimatum game, as well as to test the effects of specific manipulation of the offer structure in both the simple and embedded ultimatum games. Overall it is found that the computerized embedded game replicates the hand-run game from Pecorino and Van Boening (2010). Similar to the previous study, mean and median offers of surplus in the embedded game are significantly lower than they are in the simple game. Furthermore, small changes in the framing and offer structure result in significant changes in observed offer and dispute behavior.

Name thesis:degree_name

Ph.D. in Economics

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Economics

Year dc:date.available

2018

Author dc:creator

• Wills, Jeremiah

Contributors dc:contributor

• Mark Van Boening
• Jack Williams
• Tom Garrett

• Economics

Repository record dc:identifier

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/957

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:egrove.olemiss.edu:etd-1956