A Polanyian tack: political implications

Intellectual freedom justifies social freedom and is justified as the pursuit of truth. I argue that intellectual freedom is the creative exercise of Polanyian tacit knowing. Polanyian tacit knowing is discovery, a way to new truth. Intellectual freedom, imagined is (1) negative or primarily critical doubt and opposition to Community, Authority and Tradition (CAT) (traditional liberalism); and (2) positive or the over-emphasis of CAT (1) and (2) are untenable and eliminates intellectual freedom by nihilism or totalitarianism; in (1) by nihilism; and (2) by totalitarianism. Nihilism starts in a wrong understanding of truth or how it is pursued while totalitarianism stems from over-emphasis on CAT. Tacit knowledge is a way to analyse (1) the early Polanyi and the tension between social order and freedom; and (2) the late Polanyi and the gap between intellectual freedom and truth. Tacit knowledge presupposes CAT on the from side of tacit knowledge’s notation and overcomes CAT’s constraints by tacit knowing going to truth. Further, by restating his Hungarian Revolution as tacit knowing, tacit knowing is a way to a more truthful CAT, close the uncompleted side of tacit knowledge and solve the original problem of liberalism: its self-destruction. By framing this query in terms of Polanyian intellectual freedom, I establish a way to bring together his early social theory and late epistemology to make an original contribution to Polanyian scholarship. A Polanyian tack ought to be given more thought as to its implications for social theory.

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

PhD thesis

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

Middlesex University / Oxford Centre for Mission Studies (OCMS)

Year dc:date.issued

2017

Author dc:creator

• Hess, J.

Identifier

oai:repository.mdx.ac.uk:87385

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:repository.mdx.ac.uk:87385