{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11999"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11999","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications","abstract":"<p>The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore game theoretic applications in this field.</p> <p>In Chapter 1, we introduce SCM, RL, relevant game theoretic applications, and the organizational structure of this thesis.</p> <p>In Chapter 2, we address a newsvendor problem with resalable returns. We develop a basic model with order quantity as the single decision variable and conduct concavity analysis. We also develop a general model in which the retailer determines both order quantity and two inter-period inventory thresholds. We use simulation to investigate the timing effect of both customer demands and returns on the retailer's decision making.</p> <p>In Chapter 3, we explore the application of game theoretic models with incomplete information in inventory management. Games with incomplete information may provide a more realistic modeling framework. We hope this exposition be helpful to researchers interested in applying game theoretic models and computing equilibriums in their specific problems in SCM and RL.</p> <p>In Chapter 4 we consider a remanufacturing competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a pure remanufacturer (REM) with the OEM's incomplete information on the REM's unit cost. We apply the type-III model in Chapter 3 for formulation and derive the closed-form Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of such incomplete information on both competitors' decision making.</p> <p>We summarize in Chapter 5 and provide a general direction for future research on game theoretic applications in RL.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore game theoretic applications in this field.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In Chapter 1, we introduce SCM, RL, relevant game theoretic applications, and the organizational structure of this thesis.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In Chapter 2, we address a newsvendor problem with resalable returns. We develop a basic model with order quantity as the single decision variable and conduct concavity analysis. We also develop a general model in which the retailer determines both order quantity and two inter-period inventory thresholds. We use simulation to investigate the timing effect of both customer demands and returns on the retailer&#x27;s decision making.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In Chapter 3, we explore the application of game theoretic models with incomplete information in inventory management. Games with incomplete information may provide a more realistic modeling framework. We hope this exposition be helpful to researchers interested in applying game theoretic models and computing equilibriums in their specific problems in SCM and RL.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In Chapter 4 we consider a remanufacturing competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a pure remanufacturer (REM) with the OEM&#x27;s incomplete information on the REM&#x27;s unit cost. We apply the type-III model in Chapter 3 for formulation and derive the closed-form Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of such incomplete information on both competitors&#x27; decision making.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;We summarize in Chapter 5 and provide a general direction for future research on game theoretic applications in RL.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Wu, Sandy Huyu"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Business","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Parlar, Mahmut","Prakash Abad, Dr. Elkafi Hassini"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-04","date_published":"2012-04","updated_at":"2026-08-21T16:46:30Z","subjects":["Reverse logistics","inventory management with resalable returns","competition in remanufacturing","game theory","game theoretic applications with incomplete information","Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/6921","7962","2795945"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/6921","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"7962","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"2795945","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F11999","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Parlar, Mahmut","Prakash Abad, Dr. Elkafi Hassini"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Business"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Wu, Sandy Huyu"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T16:57:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T16:57:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2012-04"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Reverse logistics","inventory management with resalable returns","competition in remanufacturing","game theory","game theoretic applications with incomplete information","Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/6921","7962","2795945"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore game theoretic applications in this field.</p> <p>In Chapter 1, we introduce SCM, RL, relevant game theoretic applications, and the organizational structure of this thesis.</p> <p>In Chapter 2, we address a newsvendor problem with resalable returns. We develop a basic model with order quantity as the single decision variable and conduct concavity analysis. We also develop a general model in which the retailer determines both order quantity and two inter-period inventory thresholds. We use simulation to investigate the timing effect of both customer demands and returns on the retailer's decision making.</p> <p>In Chapter 3, we explore the application of game theoretic models with incomplete information in inventory management. Games with incomplete information may provide a more realistic modeling framework. We hope this exposition be helpful to researchers interested in applying game theoretic models and computing equilibriums in their specific problems in SCM and RL.</p> <p>In Chapter 4 we consider a remanufacturing competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a pure remanufacturer (REM) with the OEM's incomplete information on the REM's unit cost. We apply the type-III model in Chapter 3 for formulation and derive the closed-form Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of such incomplete information on both competitors' decision making.</p> <p>We summarize in Chapter 5 and provide a general direction for future research on game theoretic applications in RL.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Parlar, Mahmut","Prakash Abad, Dr. Elkafi Hassini"],"dc:contributor.department":["Business"],"dc:creator":["Wu, Sandy Huyu"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T16:57:53Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T16:57:53Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2012-04"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore game theoretic applications in this field.</p> <p>In Chapter 1, we introduce SCM, RL, relevant game theoretic applications, and the organizational structure of this thesis.</p> <p>In Chapter 2, we address a newsvendor problem with resalable returns. We develop a basic model with order quantity as the single decision variable and conduct concavity analysis. We also develop a general model in which the retailer determines both order quantity and two inter-period inventory thresholds. We use simulation to investigate the timing effect of both customer demands and returns on the retailer's decision making.</p> <p>In Chapter 3, we explore the application of game theoretic models with incomplete information in inventory management. Games with incomplete information may provide a more realistic modeling framework. We hope this exposition be helpful to researchers interested in applying game theoretic models and computing equilibriums in their specific problems in SCM and RL.</p> <p>In Chapter 4 we consider a remanufacturing competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a pure remanufacturer (REM) with the OEM's incomplete information on the REM's unit cost. We apply the type-III model in Chapter 3 for formulation and derive the closed-form Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use sensitivity analysis to investigate the effect of such incomplete information on both competitors' decision making.</p> <p>We summarize in Chapter 5 and provide a general direction for future research on game theoretic applications in RL.</p>"],"dc:description.degree":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"],"dc:identifier.other":["opendissertations/6921","7962","2795945"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999"],"dc:subject":["Reverse logistics","inventory management with resalable returns","competition in remanufacturing","game theory","game theoretic applications with incomplete information","Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods"],"dc:title":["Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications"],"dc:type":["thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-08-21T16:46:30Z"}